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CRC General Comment 14 on the
Right of the Child to have his or
her Best Interests taken as a
Primary Consideration
Dr Hamish Ross, Law School, Robert Gordon
University, Aberdeen
Introduction
In May 2013, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
(“CRC”) published General Comment 14 which had been
adopted at its 62nd session. General Comment 14 relates
to the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken
as a primary consideration.1 It is proposed in this article to
give attention to this the most recent General Comment to
emerge from the CRC.2
General Comments are, in effect, statements of how the
CRC believes particular matters—such as the meaning to be
given to a concept or key provision of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (the “Convention”)3—should be interpreted.
For instance, General Comment 14 relates specifically to the
right conferred in art.3, para.1 of the Convention, i.e. the right
of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary
consideration (the “article 3 right”).4
Although General Comments are not thought to be legally
binding, they are nonetheless considered to supplement,
or to offer a steer on, significant provisions of the Convention.
They are regarded as constituting authoritative
interpretations of the substantive rights conferred by the
Convention and therefore represent one of a number of
interpretive resources available to states parties in informing
their understanding of their Convention obligations. General
Comments are often used as a means of resolving the
ambiguities and uncertainties that inevitably attend the
interpretation of international human rights instruments.
Despite their authoritative legal status, however, General
Comments are not always perceived as being entirely
conclusive or decisive in relation to their subject matter.
There is a view that General Comments merely have the
status of Advisory Opinions which are to be accorded
recognition but no more than that. There is also a perception
that General Comments are broad and unsystematic
statements which need not be accorded any special legal
significance. Ultimately, this spectrum of opinion is reflected
in the diverse ways in which states have responded to
General Comments. Some regard them as an attempt to
place interpretations upon Convention provisions that they
simply do not possess. In the final analysis, though, General
Comments should at least be recognised as serving as a
useful interpretive benchmark, not only for states directly
concerned with meeting their obligations under the
Convention, but for anyone involved in the task of interpreting
the Convention.
General Comments from the CRC have been issued on
a wide variety of subjects, including the right of the child to
enjoy the highest attainable standard of health; the treatment
of unaccompanied and separated children outside their
country of origin; the right of the child to rest, leisure, play,
recreational activities, cultural life and the arts; and the
child’s right to be heard.
General Comment 14, among other things, examines
the article 3 right as a substantive right, a legal principle and
a rule of procedure. It considers the nature and scope of the
obligations of states parties to the Convention; it undertakes
a legal analysis of the article 3 right (including links with
other rights conferred under the Convention, such as the
right to be heard); and it outlines measures for the
implementation of the article 3 right (including the
introduction of procedural safeguards to guarantee
implementation of the article 3 right).
The article 3 right—art.3, para.1 of the Convention
As mentioned above, General Comment 14 focuses upon
the article 3 right, which is the right of the child to have his or
her best interests taken as a primary consideration:
...[i]n all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.5
In recent years the concept of the best interests of the child
has become all-pervasive in the vocabulary of children’s
rights6 and this is probably due in no small measure to the
influence of the Convention. General Comment 14 makes
it clear that the article 3 right applies in the context of all
actions or decisions concerning the child, whether in the
public or private sphere. The General Comment also
emphasises that the article 3 right gives expression to one
of the fundamental values of the Convention. This is
especially noteworthy because, as the author has pointed
out elsewhere,7 legal rights that necessitate consideration
of the best interests of the child imply not only what is
obvious—that children can be regarded as actually having
interests which particular rights are designed to protect—
but that the relevant interests are a reference point that is
both integral, and at the same time external, to the rights in
question. Thus, the recognition that children have interests
that underpin their rights connects the concept of the best
interests of the child with theories that view rights, at the
most fundamental level, as protected interests,8 thereby
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strengthening the grounds upon which it is possible to argue
for the existence of the rights of the child as an independent
category as against those who might, for instance, give
primacy to parental rights.9 At the same time, where interests
are both integral and external to a particular right —such as
in the case of the article 3 right—the consideration of a
child’s best interests is an aspect of the article 3 right that
the child is in a position directly to assert and insist upon.
(This is the substantive right to consideration of the best
interests of the child commented upon in more detail below.)
Additionally, the fact that such a right inevitably calls for
reference to be made to external criteria or sources in
defining and determining what is to be recognised as
constituting the best interests of the child in a given situation
may serve to establish important legal and moral
benchmarks for the treatment of children by individuals and
public and private institutions and bodies.
At the most general level, General Comment 14
emphasises that the concept of the child’s best interests is
aimed at ensuring both the full and effective enjoyment of all
the rights conferred in the Convention and the holistic
development of the child. The General Comment
emphasises that there is no hierarchy of rights in the
Convention, with all the Convention rights being considered
to be in the child’s best interests. As such, no Convention
right may be considered not to be in a child’s best interests.
It follows from this that an adult’s judgment of a child’s best
interests cannot override the obligation to respect all the
Convention rights of the child.10
Scope and application of General Comment 14
The overall aim of General Comment 14 is to ensure respect
for the interests of the child by the states parties to the
Convention, by strengthening understanding of the right of
children to have their best interests assessed and taken as
a primary consideration. The General Comment defines
requirements for giving consideration to the best interests
of the child in judicial and administrative decision-making
and in the context of other actions concerning the child as
an individual, including the enactment of laws and adoption
of policies, strategies, programmes, plans, budgets,
legislative and budgetary initiatives and guidelines
concerning children generally or as a distinct group.11 The
intention of the CRC is that General Comment 14 will guide
decisions by all those concerned with children, including
parents and caregivers. To that end, it provides only a
framework for assessing and determining the child’s best
interests. It does not actually attempt to prescribe what is
best for the child in any given situation at any particular time.
Through General Comment 14 the CRC emphasises
the tripartite structure of the article 3 right: it is a substantive
right, an interpretive legal principle and a rule of procedure.12
In the first place, the substantive right of children to have
their best interests assessed and taken as a primary
consideration may be directly invoked before a court and
may be of most relevance in a situation where, for instance,
a range of competing or conflicting interests is being
considered in order to reach a decision on the issues under
discussion.13 Secondly, as an interpretive legal principle,
the article 3 right is to be applied towards the interpretation
of other rules and principles that establish children’s rights.
Thus, if a legal provision is open to more than one
interpretation, the interpretation which most effectively serves
the child’s best interests must be given priority.14 Finally, the
article 3 right, as General Comment 14 recognises, has an
important function as a rule of procedure. Inevitably, the
assessment and determination of the best interests of the
child calls for procedural guarantees. When a decision is
being made that affects a child—whether in a judicial context
or otherwise—the decision-making process must include
an evaluation of the possible impact (positive or negative) of
the decision on the child concerned. What this means, more
specifically, is that the child has a right that decision-makers
demonstrate that the child’s best interests have been taken
into account as a primary consideration. In fulfilling their
obligations, states parties must explain how the article 3
right has been observed in decision-making processes—in
other words, what has been considered to be in the child’s
best interests. They must also make clear the criteria upon
which any decision as to best interests has been based. In
addition, they must show how the child’s interests have been
weighed against other considerations, whether broad issues
of policy or individual cases.15
Key obligations of states parties
Chapter III of General Comment 14 focuses upon the nature
and scope of the obligations of states parties to the
Convention. At the most general level, states parties must
respect the article 3 right and take all necessary, deliberate
and concrete measures for its full implementation.16
The General Comment elaborates upon the article 3
right, identifying three distinct obligations requiring to be
undertaken by states parties in giving effect to the right.17
First, there is an obligation to ensure that the child’s best
interests are appropriately integrated and consistently
applied in every action taken by a public institution (such as
judicial proceedings) which has a direct or indirect impact
upon a child. Second, there is an obligation to ensure that
all judicial and administrative decisions—including policies
and legislation relating to children—demonstrate that the
child’s best interests have been a primary consideration. (In
particular, a state has to show how the child’s best interests
have been considered and assessed and what weight has
been accorded to them in any decision.) In the third place,
states parties must ensure that the interests of the child
have been assessed and taken as a primary consideration
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in decisions and actions taken within the private sector. This
requirement extends to service-providers or other private
sector organisations which make decisions involving a child.
General Comment 14 identifies a number of
implementation measures which states parties must
undertake.18 These include reviewing and amending
domestic legislation and other sources of law to incorporate
the article 3 right. In particular, the requirement to consider
the child’s best interests must be reflected in all national
laws and legislation governing the operation of private or
public institutions so far as impacting upon children. States
parties must also establish mechanisms for complaints and
other forms of redress in order to ensure the integration and
consistent application of the article 3 right in administrative
and judicial proceedings impacting upon the child and in
all other implementation measures. From the point of view
of the allocation of national resources, the child’s best
interests must be upheld in programmes and measures
implementing children’s rights and in activities receiving
international assistance or development aid. In terms of
raising awareness of the article 3 right, appropriate
information must be provided to children and their families
and caregivers in a language they can understand. At the
same time, the conditions must be fostered for children to
express their point of view and for ensuring that their opinions
are given due weight.19
Legal analysis—general
The legal analysis in ch.IV of General Comment 14 largely
focuses on clarifying definitions of key terminology used in
the article 3 right; but it also includes consideration of
linkages between the article 3 right and other important
Convention rights, such as the right to non-discrimination
and the right to be heard.
General Comment 14 acknowledges that all actions
taken by a state will inevitably affect children in one way or
another. But that is not to suggest a requirement for states to
put in place an exhaustive process for assessing and
determining the best interests of the child unless the actions
are likely to have a significant impact on children. Clearly, in
that situation a higher level of attention to the demands of
the best interests of the child will be called for.20
The discussion in ch.IV emphasises the commonly
accepted definition of “children” as persons under the age
of 18. The reference in the article 3 right to “children” implies
what appears at first sight to be obvious—namely, that the
right applies to children not only as individuals but as a
class or group. The General Comment, however, draws
attention to something slightly less obvious, which is that
when the article 3 right is viewed as both an individual and
collective right, i.e. a right applying to individual children
and children as members of particular groups, it becomes
necessary, for purposes of giving effect to the article 3 right,
to take account of special factors such as ethnicity and the
cultural differences assignable to, for instance, indigenous
children as a group.21
The legal analysis of key phrases and expressions in
ch.IV touches upon the types of public and private institutions
and other bodies whose actions may be affected by art.3,
para.1. In this context, social welfare institutions include
those whose functions relate not only to economic, social
and cultural rights (such as healthcare, education, business
and leisure) but to institutions whose remit includes civil
rights and freedoms (such as birth registration and protection
against violence).22 The actions of courts of law, according
to the General Comment, extend to all judicial proceedings
in all instances. This is taken to include courts staffed by
both professional and lay judges and to extend to all relevant
procedures concerning children, even those of a less formal
nature such as conciliation, mediation and arbitration.23 The
best-interests principle is taken to apply not only to situations
where children are alleged to have committed offences but
where they are witnesses in criminal proceedings, e.g.
where they have been victims of crimes. The CRC
emphasises that, in order to promote the best interests of a
child, traditional retributive approaches to criminal justice
must give way to rehabilitative and restorative approaches.24
General Comment 14 also makes clear that where children
are involved in civil law proceedings their best interests must
be addressed both at the level of substantive rights and
procedural rights.25
Legal analysis—the concept of best interests
In ch.IV there is consideration of the concept of the best
interests of the child, but this is in the form of an exploration
of issues attending the interpretation of the concept rather
than any kind of elaboration of its content or listing of
instances of its appropriate use.26 The General Comment
makes clear that the content of the best interest’s concept
must be determined on a case-by-case basis. It is only
through the interpretation and implementation of the article
3 right in individual cases that a clear idea of the substance
and content of the best interest’s concept can emerge.
Moreover, the contextual dependency of the concept implies
that in given instances a child’s personal situation and needs
will influence the determination of his or her best interests.
In the case of collective decisions—such as those made by
legislators and policymakers—the particular circumstances
of the groups of children affected by the decisions must be
factored into any assessment of best interests.27
So far as the implementation of the article 3 right is
concerned, the CRC takes the view that ongoing impact
assessments are an effective means of ensuring that the
best interests of the child are a primary consideration in (for
example) legislative programmes and policy development.28
The aim is to predict the impact of any proposed law, policy
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or budgetary allocation on children and on the exercise by
children of their rights; and to assess the actual impact once
effect has been given to the relevant measures.
Chapter IV also emphasises that the task of ensuring
that the best interests of the child are a primary consideration
is not simply a matter for the discretion of states parties to
the Convention.29 States have an obligation to ensure the
implementation of all elements of the article 3 right. It is not
merely an option. As the General Comment notes:
“The expression ‘primary consideration’
means that the child’s best interests may not
be considered on the same level as all other
considerations. This strong position is
justified by the special situation of the child:
dependency, maturity, legal status and, often,
voicelessness. Children have less possibility
than adults to make a strong case for their
own interests and those involved in decisions
affecting them must be explicitly aware of their
interests. If the interests of children are not
highlighted, they tend to be overlooked.”30
In problematic situations where there is perceived to be a
conflict between the best interests of a child as an individual
and those of an identifiable group of children (e.g.
indigenous children), or children generally, the CRC
suggests that the solution may lie in a case-by-case
assessment of the situation where the interests of all parties
are carefully balanced so as to reach a suitable
compromise. A similar approach could be adopted where a
child’s rights are in conflict with the rights of other persons.31
As previously mentioned, the legal analysis undertaken
in chapter IV also highlights connections between the Article
3 right and other provisions of the Convention.32 General
Comment 14 focuses in particular on linkages between the
best interest’s concept and important rights such as the
right to non-discrimination (art.2), the right to life, survival
and development (art.6) and the right to be heard (art.12).
Needless to say, any assessment of a child’s best interests
must include respect for all of those rights. It is worth noting,
though, that the extent of “infiltration” of the best interest’s
concept within the Convention is significantly wider than
this. For example, explicit references to the concept can be
found in: art.9 (separation from parents); art.10 (family
reunification); art.18 (parental responsibilities); art.20
(deprivation of family environment and alternative care);
art.21 (adoption); art.37 (separation from adults in detention);
and art.40 (procedural guarantees).
Measures for the implementation of the article 3 right
Arguably the most practically and professionally useful part
of General Comment 14 is ch.V, which focuses on measures
that may be appropriate for the implementation of the article
3 right. Chapter V opens with a piece of practical advice for
anyone involved in assessing and determining the best
interests of a child. The first step is to find out—within the
specific factual context of the situation in hand— what are
the relevant elements in a best-interests assessment; then
give those elements concrete content, and assign a weight
to each in relation to the other. The second step involves
following a procedure that ensures the proper application
of the article 3 right and the provision of appropriate legal
guarantees and safeguards.33
Chapter V also usefully proposes elements to be taken
into consideration when assessing and determining the
child’s best interests. These elements, which are set out in
paras 52 to 79, are wide-ranging and include taking account
of the views of the child and the child’s identity; preserving
the family environment; considering the safety of the child;
and taking account of particular vulnerabilities of the child.
Briefly, the task of taking account of, and giving due weight
to, the views of the child has its origins in art.12 of the
Convention which provides for the right of children to express
their views in every decision that affects them.34 The age of
children, the presence of disabilities or the situation that
they find themselves in—such as a situation of special
vulnerability, e.g. as a refugee—neither deprives them of the
right to express their views nor reduces the weight to be
given to their views.35 According to General Comment 14
the adoption of measures that ensure the exercise of equal
rights for children in such situations must be subject to an
individual assessment which assures a role to the children
themselves in determining their best interests.36
The right of the child to preserve his or her identity is
enshrined in art.8 of the Convention. A child’s identity includes
sex, sexual orientation, national origin, religion and beliefs,
cultural identity and personality. Chapter V of the General
Comment emphasises that diversity, as part of identity, must
be taken into account when assessing a child’s best interests.
In the case of religious or cultural identity, for instance, a
decision such as the placement of a child in a foster home
should ideally have regard to preserving the continuity of a
child‘s previous religious, ethnic, cultural and linguistic
upbringing and background. The General Comment,
however, warns that cultural identity would not justify the
perpetuation by decision-makers of traditions and cultural
values that, for example, deny a child important rights (beyond
the article 8 right) guaranteed by the Convention.37
The task of taking account of particular vulnerabilities of
the child in determining his or her best interests calls for an
assessment that encompasses matters such as whether
the child has a disability, whether he or she is a member of
a minority group, or is a refugee or asylum seeker or a victim
of abuse. From a practical standpoint, decision-makers are
urged to take account of the different kinds and degrees of
vulnerability of each child, assessing each situation
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according to the uniqueness of each child. General
Comment 14 therefore recommends that an individualised
assessment of each child’s history from birth should be
undertaken and regularly reviewed.38
Chapter V concludes with a practical outline of procedural
safeguards necessary to guarantee the implementation of
the child’s best interests. The discussion ranges from the
right of the child to express his or her views, through legal
representation, to the requirement, where appropriate, to carry
out child-rights impact assessments (“CRIAs”).39
Conclusion
General Comment 14 seems to have been a long time in
coming, particularly given the pivotal and all-pervasive nature
of the best-interests principle in the jurisprudence of
children’s rights. This General Comment, therefore,
represents a valuable and welcome addition to the
interpretive resources available not only to those most
immediately subject to the Convention (i.e. states parties),
but basically to anyone with a professional or other interest
in ensuring that the best-interests principle is observed in
every situation touching the rights of the child.
Ultimately the question of what is or is not in a child’s
best interests is not something to which there is ever a ready
or straightforward answer. From situations involving a single
child to those involving distinct groupings of children (and
indeed “all children”, in some settings) the question is
dependent upon a wide variety of elements – of which no
single element necessarily predominates – and many subtle
balancing acts and judgment calls. The unique
achievement of General Comment 14 is to identify the most
critical issues, factors and elements involved in the
assessment of a child’s best interests and to provide a useful
and practical framework for key decisions and actions made
pursuant to such assessments.
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